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The legal fiction of a genuine link as a requirement for the grant of 
nationality to ships and humans – the triumph of formality over 
substance? 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This paper compares and contrasts the nationality of a persona in the strict sense of the word 
– of a human being – with the legal fiction sense of the term – of an inanimate thing, a (res). 
It attempts to answer the question: how does the law regulate and distinguish human beings, 
on the one hand, and res enjoying nationality, on the other, and whether both these persons 
–  natural (or physical) and legal (or fictitious) – are treated in the same manner or otherwise 
in so far as nationality law is concerned? It observes that whilst in public international law 
both a human and a ship are (i) considered objects of the law, (ii) afforded legal personality 
and, (iii) exceptionally in the case of those res which enjoy nationality, these two categories 
of persons are afforded a nationality. Although similarities exist between humans and the 
said res, it is clear that the legal regime regulating nationality does have its nuances when it 
deals with two types of persons.  
 
To answer the question which it posits, this paper is divided into three parts: in the first part, 
very briefly, it sets out the juridical nature of nationality distinguishing it from other legal 
institutes such as registration and legal personality. In the second part, nationality of a res is 
discussed, albeit restrictively in so far as a ship is allowed by the international community of 
states to partake of nationality. The third part considers nationality rules which are pertinent 
to animate persons whilst the conclusion draws comparisons, contrasts and parallels 
between both nationality of an animate and an inanimate person. It concludes that in the 
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case of a ship, by its own very nature she is a creature of the law, being more the product of 
commercial maritime law, whose mind and will is dominated by a human being, for a ship is 
owned and managed/operated by a human or by a body corporate (itself owned and 
managed by a human being), whilst in the case of animate persons their nationality derives 
more from their loyalty to the state of their nationality. On the other hand, recourse to the 
commodification of nationality, in so far as animate persons are concerned, is more the 
exception rather than the rule as there can be said to be no widespread consistent and 
uniform state practice which can be quoted in support of the crystallisation of an emerging 
norm of customary international law to this effect. In the case of humans, nationality is 
dictated more by security and social interests than by a functional consideration as in the 
case of a res enjoying a fictional personhood and partaking of the legal regime of 
nationality. 
 
2. The Juridical Nature of Nationality 
 
The law protects, recognizes and ascribes duties and rights not only to humans but also to 
other inanimate things. Yet the latter cannot be considered to be at a par with a natural 
person. For instance, certain laws protect human beings prior to birth. Such is the case with 
domestic violence where an unborn child in the mother’s womb is afforded protection from 
a violent spouse or partner. Yet there are certain situations where a physical person is 
granted at law certain rights and duties which an inanimate thing cannot enjoy. The right to 
education, to vote at elections or referenda, or to express freely oneself are rights 
specifically reserved only to the human species. Yet again there are situations where a res is 
granted rights akin to a human being but which other inanimate objects do not enjoy. Such 
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is the case with the right of arrest which, though it extends to a person and to a ship,1 it does 
not cover a company, foundation or other res. A contrariu sensu, there are other situations 
regulated by law where enforcement action can be taken against a res but not against a 
physical person. Take the case of a sale by auction of a ship. In the case of humans, slavery 
has been outlawed by international human rights law even though in the past this institute 
was regulated and allowed by law as in the case of Roman Law. Although both humans and 
ships can be classified under the heading of ‘person’ – whether physical in the former case 
or legal in the latter case – those res which are ascribed legal personality remain in an 
inferior and subordinate status to that of a natural person in so far as it is the latter who 
enjoy the jus utendi, jus fruendi et jus abutendi of the ship, not vice-versa. A human being 
can own, enjoy the fruits of, dispose of, destroy and exercise other acts of dominium over a 
res enjoying nationality which the latter can never do in relation to a physical person. 
Indeed, it is a human being who represents the will of the res enjoying nationality as, 
although the latter enjoys legal personality in its own right, distinct and separate from 
animate persons, it has no will of its own, in the sense that it is a human being who guides, 
operates and manages its actions and omissions. It is in this limited respect that such a res 
does not enjoy the full legal capacity of a human being. 
 
Subjects of international law – primarily states – enjoy both rights and obligations. 
However, objects of international law other than human beings, such as ships, aircraft and 
spacecraft, are dispensed by specific provision of law from carrying out all the duties which 
a human being might be requested by law to perform. Yet not all subjects of the law are 
treated equally. For instance, within the human class there are situations where by law a 
male can marry at sixteen years of age and a female at fourteen. In so far as ships are 
                                                          
1 Aircraft are another res enjoying nationality. See Convention on International Civil Aviation, art. 17, Dec. 7, 
1944, 15 U.N.T.S. 295. 
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concerned, a small ship need not be registered in a merchant shipping registry while a larger 
one must, de rigueur, be so registered, apart from being requested to comply with several 
applicable international conventions. Hence even amongst objects of international law inter 
se, whether animate or inanimate, the law affords them a different treatment. 
 
Three key terms need to be discussed in relation to objects of international law. These are: 
nationality, registration and legal personality. In the case of humans, nationality is quite 
straight forward. A human being owes allegiance to the state of which s/he is national, and 
this rule applies even in cases of dual or multiple nationality. This means that the state has 
certain rights and obligations vis-a-vis its citizens and vice-versa. There is therefore a bond 
between the state and its nationals. Nationality of a human being is ascertained in several 
ways. This can be acquired through birth, marriage, purchase, etc. In the case of a res 
enjoying nationality, like that of a ship, it is ascertained normally through registration. 
Needless to say, laws related to ship registration vary from one jurisdiction to another and so 
do the requirements and conditions for registration. Thus nationality and registration are not 
coterminous. This is because registration can be considered to be a connecting factor 
between the res (the ship in question) and its nationality. Registration of a ship is very much 
similar to the registration of a birth certificate of a human being in his or her state of birth 
registry. It is therefore a means of proving that a ship has been ‘born’ when it has been 
registered in a merchant shipping registry. The same applies to when a physical person dies 
and a ship is deregistered. Registration also demonstrates the genuine link between the ship 
and the state in which it is registered. The documentation in the case of a ship would be the 
certificate of registration in terms of the applicable Merchant Shipping statute. In the case of 
a physical person, the documentation would be the official act of civil status related to his or 
her birth (or death) – the birth (or death) certificate issued by the competent authority of the 
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applicable state. Nigel P. Ready is of the view that: ‘Registration means the entering of a 
matter in the public records. Registration is generally – but not always – not only a 
precondition for, but also the test of, a vessel’s nationality.’2 He further opines that the 
‘public law functions of registration’ include: 
 
 the allocation of a vessel to a specific state and its subjection to a single 
jurisdiction for the purposes, for example, of safety regulations, crewing, and 
discipline on board; 
 the conferment of the right to fly the national flag; 
 the right to diplomatic protection and consular assistance by the flag state; 
 the right to naval protection by the flag State; 
 the right to engage in certain activities within the territorial waters of the flag 
State – for example, coastal fishing or trading between the ports of the flag State 
(cabotage); 
 in the case of war, for determining the application of the rules of war and 
neutrality to a vessel.3 
 
Registration in the case of a ship can be treated as equivalent to birth in the case of a human 
being. Whilst in the case of the latter birth is one of the criteria upon which nationality is 
conferred, there are other criteria in lieu of birth which, if satisfied, are nationality ascribing 
such as through marriage, purchase or residence for a specified period of time, say five 
years. But in the case of a ship, nationality can be acquired mainly, though not exclusively 
as in the case of a bareboat charter, through registration. 
                                                          
2 READY, Nigel. P. Nationality, Registration and Ownership of Ships. In FITZMAURICE, Malgosia, 
MARTÍNEZ GUTIÉRREZ, Norman, ARROYO, Ignacio, and BELJA, Elda (eds). The IMLI Manual of 
International Maritime Law, Volume 2: Shipping Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, p. 25. 
3 Ibid., p. 25. 
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A physical person can enjoy nationality, domicile and residence but this is not the case of a 
ship which enjoys only nationality. A ship may be owned by a physical person who has a 
distinct and separate nationality of his/her own or by a non-physical legal person such as a 
company which, though incorporated under the laws of a sovereign state, is not endowed 
with a nationality even though the company might be trading overseas. The requirement to 
ascribe nationality to a ship is considered to be a functional one because ‘the high seas are 
not subject to the jurisdiction of any State. If, then, public order is to be preserved on the 
high seas, the right to navigate there must be restricted to those vessels which, through their 
link with a subject of international law, are subjected to its jurisdiction and can thus be 
required to comply with the network of customary and conventional rules which make up 
the public order of the oceans.’4 It is clear from this passage that ships, nationality serves a 
particular intended function. This is evident through the way the genuine link of a ship to 
the flag state is incorporated in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 
(UNCLOS). Ships enjoy nationality simply for jurisdiction and enforcement purposes. For 
instance, when, on the high seas, they have to be regulated by law and whatever happens 
there on board that ship has to be regulated by international law. Otherwise, anarchy would 
prevail. The best solution devised by the human species so far over time is to afford, by way 
of a legal fiction, a nationality to a ship so that its acts and omissions, and whatever happens 
on board that ship whilst on the high seas, is regulated by law. This is the reason why, 
therefore, nationality of a ship has a functional character. If nationality is not granted to a 
ship on the high seas it will end up immune from legal process, lawless and stateless. As an 
antecedent to UNCLOS, in the Nottebohm case,5 the International Court of Justice ruled that 
                                                          
4 BROWN, Edward D. The International Law of the Sea, Volume 1: Introductory Manual. Aldershot: 
Dartmouth Publishing Company Limited, 1994, p. 287. 
5 Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.) (second phase), Judgment of April 6th, 1955: ICJ Reports 1955 p. 4. 
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‘the nationality of an individual presupposed the existence of a substantive connection 
between the individual and the State whose nationality he claimed.’6  
 
Nationality of ships is referred to in several provisions of UNCLOS, notably articles 29, 
91(1) and (2), 104, 106, and 110(1)(d) and (e). Of particular relevance is article 91(1) which, 
inter alia, allows Contracting Parties to grant their nationality to ships provided that there 
‘must exist a genuine link between the State and the ship’. However, UNCLOS does not 
define what constitutes a ‘genuine link’ or how can it be determined. The Convention then 
regulates the consequences of granting such nationality, as follows: 
 
 the ship has to abide by ‘the conditions for the grant of its nationality to 
ships’ which conditions are laid down by the State Party’ (Article 91(1)) 
 the flag state has the right to regulate the conditions ‘for the registration of 
ships in its territory’ (Article 91(1)) 
 the flag state can further impose those conditions it deems fit upon a ship to 
be able to enjoy ‘the right to fly its flag’ (Article 91(1)) 
 the flag state which has granted nationality to a ship ‘shall issue to ships to 
which it has granted the right to fly its flag documents to that effect’ (Article 91(2)) 
 a ship retains ‘its nationality although it has become a pirate ship (Article 
104) 
 ‘retention or loss of nationality is determined by the law of the State from 
which such nationality was derived’ (Article 104) 
                                                          
6 READY, supra note 2, at 30. 
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 the state which has wrongfully seized a ship on suspicion of piracy is liable 
to ‘the State the nationality of which is possessed by the ship ... for any loss or 
damage caused by the seizure’ (Article 106) 
 a warship may exercise its right of visit if it is suspected that ‘the ship is 
without nationality’ (Article 110(1)(d)) 
 a warship may also exercise its right of visit where ‘though flying a foreign 
flag or refusing to show its flag, the ship is, in reality, of the same nationality of the 
warship’ (Article 110(1)(e)) 
 a warship has to bear ‘the external marks distinguishing such ships of its 
nationality’ (Article 29). 
 
Nationality has to be distinguished not only from registration but also from legal 
personality. Nationals – whether animate or inanimate – are endowed with legal personality 
but even corporate bodies established by or under a law enjoy such an attribute even if they 
are nationals of a state. Whilst local councils in Malta are established by the Local Councils 
Act7 and are all listed in a Schedule to that law, companies are established under the Maltese 
Companies Act8 but are not so listed in the law. Yet both Maltese local councils9 and 
companies10 enjoy legal personality. Physical persons, due to their inherent ontological 
nature are persons in their own right but the law does extend personhood to other inanimate 
objects of the law. A ship is an instance of a res which has legal personality bestowed upon 
it by law and not because personhood inheres therein. 
 
 
                                                          
7 Chapter 363 of the Laws of Malta. 
8 Chapter 386 of the Laws of Malta. 
9 Local Councils Act, § 3(2). 
10 Companies Act, § 4(4). 
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A. Nationality of a Res 
 
I. Quasi-personification of ships  
 
Ships and humans are both endowed with nationality as distinct from mere legal personality. 
In the case of ships and aircraft international conventions specifically refer to nationality, 
whereas Article II of the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space 
1975 refers to registration and does not make any reference to nationality.11 The 
personification theory in relation to ships has long been espoused as one possible source 
relating to the origin of maritime liens and the in rem procedure in Admiralty Law.12 A ship 
can be viewed as an extension of the land territory of the flag state,13 although this ‘floating 
territory’,14 or ‘ambulatory province’15 theory is subject to doubts and some obvious 
limitations.16 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), art. 91, Dec. 10th, 1982 833 U.N.T.S. 3; 
Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention), art. 17, Dec. 7th, 1944, 15 U.N.T.S. 295; 
Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, art. II, Jan. 14th, 1975 1023 U.N.T.S. 15.  
12 See PRICE, Griffith. The Law of Maritime Liens. London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1940, pp. 5-6, where 
reference is made to writings by Judge Holmes; SCHOENBAUM, Thomas J. Admiralty and Maritime Law.  
St. Paul, Minn.: West Group, 2001, §7.1; The Comandante, (2008) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 119, at §103-107; and 
Senior Courts Act, 1981, c. 54, § 21(3) (U.K.). 
13 See The Angel Bell [1979] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 491, per Donaldson J. It is notable that the Italian Navigation 
Code codifies the principle that an Italian-flagged vessel on the high seas constitutes Italian territory. The 
PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS OF THE SHORT CODE OF NAVIGATION, para. 4 (2002) states that: ‘Le 
navi italiane in alto mare ... sono considerati come territorio italiano.’ (Translation: Italian ships on the high 
seas ... are considered part of the Italian territory). 
14 See COLES, Richard M.F., And WATT, Edward. Ship Registration: Law and Practice. London: Informa, 
2009, at §1.22. 
15 Ibid. 
16 See MEYERS, Herman. The Nationality of Ships. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1967, at p. 13 et seq.  
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II. Registration of Ships 
 
Nationality of a ship as distinct from nationality of its owner has been said to have emerged 
as a matter of State practice at the commencement of the nineteenth century.17 Registration 
of a ship is necessary as a matter of practice because a vessel or its owner may need the 
assistance or intervention of the flag state18 particularly when the ship is operating beyond 
the remit of the flag state’s territorial jurisdiction,19 and also because an unregistered ship is 
likely to encounter problems similar to those that would be encountered by a stateless 
citizen20 and in terms of customary international law would be ‘subject to the jurisdiction of 
all States’21 Another important reason however why ships and aircraft require nationality, 
unlike other items without nationality e.g. cars or trucks,22 which do not, as a matter of 
routine,  operate outside areas of national jurisdiction,  is that nationality determines the 
applicable criminal law in areas beyond national jurisdiction. Furthermore, the availability 
of lending facility may depend on registration of the asset in a registry with sufficient legal 
protection for a lending institution registered as a mortgagee. In the case of ships it would 
appear that the main peace-time attraction of a flag state is the imposition of low tonnage tax 
by that state, and in times of conflict the principal attraction is the availability of the 
protection afforded to the registered ship by the naval forces of the flag state or its status as 
a neutral vessel. The view that a vessel can have a nationality without being registered is 
                                                          
17 See COGLIATI-BANTZ, Vincent P. Means of Transportation and Registration of Nationality. Abingdon, 
Oxon.; New York, NY: Routledge, 2015, p. 17. 
18 See Arctic Sunrise (Kingdom of the Netherlands v. Russian Federation) ITLOS, Nov. 22, 2013. 
19 COGLIATI-BANTZ, supra note 17, at 17 where it is stated that ‘[t]he foundation of the concept of 
nationality was to ensure good order in international spaces, an order guaranteed by States, and the benefits of 
that order would be enjoyed by individuals through States.’  
20 See The Asya [1948] AC 351 at 369 where the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (on appeal from the 
Supreme Court of Palestine) acknowledged that on the high seas a vessel without registration was severely 
handicapped in international law: ‘For the freedom of the open sea, whatever those words may connote, is a 
freedom of ships which fly, and are entitled to fly, the flag of a State which is within the comity of nations. 
The Asya did not satisfy these elementary conditions. No question of comity nor of any breach of international 
law can arise if there is no State under whose flag the vessel sails’ (per Lord Simonds).  
21 COGLIATI-BANTZ, supra note 17, p. 19. 
22 Ibid., p. 49. 
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supported by the provisions of the very first section, specifically 1(1)(c), of the UK 
Merchant Shipping Act 1995.23  
 
III. Commercialisation of Nationality/Registration 
 
Nationality has been commercialised for a very long time in the case of ships and this 
coincides with the emergence of flags of convenience and off-shore registry systems,24 
Although a ship’s nationality may be ascertainable in the absence of registration,25 there are 
obvious benefits accompanying registration. It would appear that registration of ships 
emerged at the time of the Roman Empire, and harks back to 1660 in England.26 The second 
sentence in Article 91 of UNCLOS, provides that ‘ships have the nationality of the State 
whose flag they are entitled to fly’.27 Although the current ship registration in flag of 
convenience systems has been broadly criticised as conducive to unideal shipping practices 
leading to problems with safety at sea and crew welfare, the regime is still widely available 
                                                          
23 Section 1 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1995, c. 21 (U.K.) states that:  
‘(1) A ship is a British ship if— 
(a) the ship is registered in the United Kingdom under Part II; or 
(b) the ship is, as a Government ship, registered in the United Kingdom in pursuance of 
an Order in Council under section 308; or 
(c) the ship is registered under the law of a relevant British possession; or 
(d) the ship is a small ship other than a fishing vessel and— 
(i) is not registered under Part II, but 
(ii) is wholly owned by qualified owners, and 
(iii) is not registered under the law of a country outside the United Kingdom.’ (emphasis added). 
24 See MANDARAKA-SHEPPARD, Aleka. Modern Maritime Law and Risk Management. London: 
Routledge-Cavendish, 2007, second edition, p. 278. 
25 See COLES et al, supra note 14, at §1.8. 
26 Ibid., at §1.6. 
27 See also Convention on the High Seas, art 5, Apr. 29, 1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 82. In relation to nationality of 
aircraft, see the Convention on International Civil Aviation, art. 17, supra note 9, which provides that: 
‘Aircraft have the nationality of the State in which they are registered’. Although there are differences between 
flags of convenience in shipping and the maritime industries (ODUNTAN, Gbenga. Sovereignty and 
Jurisdiction in the Airspace and Outer Space. London: Routledge, 2012, p. 8), one cannot help but notice that 
the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation of 1944 does not contain the unequivocal pre-
registration ‘genuine link’ stipulation provided for in the Convention Relating to the Regulation of Aerial 
Navigation, art. 7, Oct. 13, 1919, 11 L.N.T.S. 173: ‘No aircraft shall be entered on the register of one of the 
contracting States unless it belongs wholly to nationals of such State. No incorporated company can be 
registered as the owner of an aircraft unless it possess the nationality of the State in which the aircraft is 
registered, unless the president or chairman of the company and at least two-thirds of the directors possess 
such nationality, and unless the company fulfils all other conditions which may be prescribed by the laws of 
the said State.’ 
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and there is stiff competition for business between the various open-registries. The 
weaknesses in the flag-state regulatory regime are in part addressed by systems of port-state 
control, by the role played by classification societies, and by contractual requirements in 
marine insurance contracts, relating to classification or nationality.28 The existence of the 
need and effectiveness of port-state control is a strong indictment of the flag of convenience 
system which claims as its raison d’être the flag-state’s control over the registered vessel. 
Moreover, in a fashion similar to, but clearly distinct from, dual citizenship, parallel 
registration of ships is readily available in some legal systems through the system of 
bareboat charter registration.29 Dual, as distinct from parallel, nationality of a ship would 
render a ship effectively stateless vis-à-vis other states.30 Furthermore besides the possibility 
of different categories of registration within one system (e.g. small ship’s register, fishing 
vessel registration), some legal systems offer more than one system of registration via a 
second register as in the case of Norway31 or an offshore register;32 this latter phenomenon 
has been described as the response of traditional maritime state’s to the unlikelihood of any 
attempt to abolish flags of convenience.33  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
28 See, for instance, International Hull Clauses (Nov., 1 2003), clauses 13 and 14.   
29 See, e.g., the UK Merchant Shipping, Registration of Ships Regulations 1993 (S.I. 1993/3138) which 
provide for bareboat chartering-in of a vessel whose ownership remains registered in another jurisdiction. The 
parallel nature of bareboat charter registration is evident from the provisions of section 17 of the UK Merchant 
Shipping Act, 1995, c. 21 (U.K.) whereby a vessel bareboat chartered into the British ship registration system 
is entitled to fly the British maritime flag: the Merchant Shipping Act, 1995, c. 21 (U.K.) will broadly apply to 
such a ship as it does to other British-registered vessels; however in terms of section 17, private law matters 
are referred to the law of the country  of the underlying (ownership)  registry. For details relating to bareboat 
charter registration in general, see COLES et al, supra note 14, Chapter 4. 
30 See UNCLOS, supra, art. 92. 
31 See, e.g., the Act of 12 June 1987 No. 48 (Nor.) relating to a Norwegian International Ship Register (NIS). 
32 See, COLES et al, supra note 14, at §3.10 and §3.39 to §3.49. 
33 Ibid., at §3.39. 
13 
 
IV. The Genuine Link Quandary 
 
The reluctance to create a system where there is a proper link between the ship and the flag 
state is evident from the fact that the United Nations Convention on Conditions for the 
Registration of Ships 198634 is still not in force; that Convention refers to the strengthening 
of a genuine link between a ship and the flag state,35 and to vague requirements in relation to 
ownership and manning of the said ship.36 For instance the now defunct provisions of 
Section 1 of the UK Merchant Shipping Act 189437 relating to registration of British ships 
were very strict in relation to ownership requirements to the extent that for corporate bodies 
to become owners of a British ship it must be ‘established under and subject to the laws of 
some part of the British dominions, and having their principal place of business in those 
dominions’ and in relation to British born individuals who have become citizens of a foreign 
state, it is prescribed that they ‘are not  qualified unless they take the oath of allegiance and 
also, during the period of ownership, are resident in the British dominions or are partners in 
a firm carrying on business in the British dominions.’38 This approach has been watered 
down in the current law in the UK secondary legislation largely as a result of European law 
implications including the right of free movement of workers.39  
 
                                                          
34 U.N. doc. TD/RS/CONF/23, done at Geneva on Feb. 7, 1986. 
35 See Article 1 (Objectives): ‘For the purpose of ensuring or, as the case may be, strengthening the genuine 
link between a State and ships flying its flag, and in order to exercise effectively its jurisdiction and control 
over such ships with regard to identification and accountability of shipowners and operators as well as with 
regard to administrative, technical, economic and social matters, a flag State shall apply the provisions 
contained in this Convention.’ 
36 See in particular the UN Convention on Conditions for Registration of Ships, arts. 7, 8 and 9, supra, note 34.  
See, further, The United Nations Convention on the Registration of Inland Navigation Vessels, art. 3, Jan. 25, 
1965, 964 U.N.T.S. 223. 
37 57 & 58 Vict. C. 60. 
38 EARL OF HALSBURY. Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol. XXVI. London: Butterworth & Co, 1914, §7. 
39 See regulations 7 and 8 of the Merchant Shipping (Registration of Ships) Regulations 1993, supra note 29. 
Re fishing vessels see paragraph 14 of the said Statutory Instrument and Regina v Secretary of State for 
Transport (Case C 221/89) Court of Justice of the European Communities [1992] 3 W.L.R. 288 [1992] Q.B. 
680. 
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The strict approach adopted in the UK Merchant Shipping Act 1894 can be contrasted with 
registration of ships, in open registries or flags of convenience, which is largely based on a 
simple administrative procedure linked to the requirement that the shipowner, usually itself 
a legal fiction, i.e. a company or corporation, must be incorporated in that state,40 despite the 
vague norm specified in Article 91 of UNCLOS that ‘there must exist a genuine link 
between the State and the ship’.  Furthermore, in a substantial number of cases, the link is 
even more tenuous and is based simply on an extremely slender relationship between the 
flag state and a fictitious legal person not necessarily based in the flag state, with the only 
requirement being the nomination by that company or corporation of an agent with 
residence in the flag-state.41 Despite the desirability of a normative insistence of a real link 
between a vessel and the flag state, the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea 
(ITLOS) has stated that the need of the genuine link requirement in Article 91 of UNCLOS 
is ‘to secure more effective implementation of the duties of the flag State, and not to 
establish criteria by reference to which the validity of the registration of ships of a flag State 
may be challenged by other States’.42 This view is a continuation of the approach enunciated 
                                                          
40 The same can be said about the registration or immatriculation of civilian aircraft under the aircraft 
registration system in Malta (See in particular the Aircraft Registration Act, §6(1)(d) and 19 (Chapter 503 of 
the Laws of Malta).  
41 See, for instance, Chapter 234 of the Laws of Malta, §4, which provides that: 
‘(1) A ship shall not be eligible to be registered under this Act unless owned wholly by persons of the 
following description (in this Act referred to as persons qualified to own a Maltese ship), namely - 
(a) citizens of Malta; 
(b) bodies corporate established under and subject to the laws of Malta having their principal 
place of business in Malta or having a place of business in Malta and satisfying the Minister that 
they can and will ensure due observance of the laws of Malta relating to merchant shipping; 
(c) such other persons as the Minister may, by regulations, prescribe, 
and, saving any other provision of this Act, if a registered ship ceases to be owned wholly by persons qualified 
to own a Maltese ship, such ship shall cease to be a Maltese ship.’ 
This provision should be read in conjunction with regulation 4 of the Ships eligible for Registration 
Regulations (S.L. 234.23) which provides for ownership of a Maltese vessel by an international owner 
(defined in paragraph 2 of the said regulations). A most tenuous of links is required between the international 
owner and the flag state by regulation 5 which imposes the requirement by the shipowner of having a resident 
agent who is habitually resident in Malta. This approach for registration of merchant vessels is substantially 
wider that the Maltese law counterpart in relation to aircraft registration (See S.L. 503.01, the Aircraft 
Registration (International Registrant) Regulations, 2010 (L. N. 537 of 2010). 
42 The M/V Saiga (No. 2) (1999) 120 ILR 133, [83]. See also The M/V “Virginia G”, ITLOS, Apr. 14, 2014, 
where it is stated at paragraph 113 that: ‘In the view of the Tribunal, once a ship is registered, the flag State is 
required, under article 94 of the Convention, to exercise effective jurisdiction and control over that ship in 
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in the Muscat Dhows case to the effect that ‘generally speaking it belongs to every 
Sovereign to decide to whom he will accord the right to fly his flag and to prescribe the 
rules governing such grants’,43 and essentially as long there is the exercise of ‘effective 
jurisdiction and control’44 by the flag state’, a genuine link is de iure in existence; the 
dubious and questionable interpretative approach adopted in The M/V Saiga (No. 2) and 
later case-law45 effectively can stultify the patent purpose for which international law 
requires a ‘genuine link’; it is difficult to argue against the requirement of a genuine link 
ascertainable immediately before the coming into effect of the actual registration of the 
specific ship, rather than its relegation  to the mere formality of post-registration control,46 
for instance the obligation of the flag state to require the master of the said ship to render 
assistance in terms of Article 98 of UNCLOS. ITLOS’s approach can be characterised as 
evidence of the triumph of formality over substance, and can be contrasted with the more 
sensible approach applied in relation to the process of naturalization in the Nottebohm47 case 
dealt with below to the effect that: ‘[t]hat naturalization was not based on any real prior 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
order to ensure that it operates in accordance with generally accepted international regulations, procedures and 
practices. This is the meaning of “genuine link”’. See, further, the enforcement obligations under Article 217 
of UNCLOS 1982 supra note 11. 
43 Great Britain v. France, Perm. Ct. Arb. 1905, The Hague Arbitration Cases (1915), 69 at 72. See also 
statement by Justice Jackson (US Supreme Court) in Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (73 S.Ct. 921, 97 L.Ed. 
1254) 1953. [online]. Available at: <http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/345/571#fn17> Accessed: 
21.11. 2013): ‘Each state under international law may determine for itself the conditions on which it will grant 
its nationality to a merchant ship, thereby accepting responsibility for it and acquiring authority over it. 
Nationality is evidenced to the world by the ship's papers and its flag. The United States has firmly and 
successfully maintained that the regularity and validity of a registration can be questioned only by the 
registering state.’ 
44 The M/V “Virginia G”, supra note 42 at §111. 
45 Similarly in The M/V “Virginia G” supra note 42, it is stated at §110: ‘The Tribunal considers that Article 
91, paragraph 1, third sentence of the Convention [UNCLOS] requiring a genuine link between the flag state 
and the ship should not be read as establishing prerequisites or conditions to be satisfied for the exercise of the 
right of the flag State to grant its nationality to ships.’  
46 See in particular paragraph 83 of the ITLOS judgment: ‘83. The conclusion of the Tribunal is that the 
purpose of the provisions of the Convention on the need for a genuine link between a ship and its flag State is 
to secure more effective implementation of the duties of the flag State, and not to establish criteria by reference 
to which the validity of the registration of ships in a flag State may be challenged by other States.’ The ITLOS 
came to this conclusion after reviewing the legislative history of Article 94 of UNCLOS 1982. The remedy for 
a State with doubts about the appropriateness (relating to ‘proper jurisdiction and control’) of a ship’s 
registration is to utilise the remedy available via Article 94(6) of the said Convention providing for a lodging 
of a report to that effect with a flag state.  
47 Nottebohm Case, supra note 5. 
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connection with Liechtenstein, nor did it in any way alter the manner of life of the person 
upon whom it was conferred in exceptional circumstances of speed and accommodation… It 
was granted without regard to the concept of nationality adopted in international relations.’    
 
V. Stateless Ships & Interdiction 
 
The purported right of outright seizure of a stateless ships is a highly debatable matter, and 
it appears that there are at least two views, that is, that such ship enjoys no protection, and 
the seemingly more acceptable view that ‘some further jurisdictional nexus or permissive 
rule is required to justify seizure’.48 Meyers suggests that, in the absence of a ship being 
reasonably suspected of being involved in the slave trade or piracy49 or if the ship is the 
object of the exercise of the right of hot pursuit by the coastal state,50 there are substantial 
limits on the rights of a state to seize or inspect a stateless vessel on the high seas.51 
UNCLOS does not provide the right of universal jurisdiction in relation to a stateless vessel, 
although in terms of Article 110 (right of visit), the said Convention does permit a warship52 
to ‘proceed to verify the ship’s right to fly its flag’ if there is ‘reasonable ground for 
suspecting that …the ship is without nationality’, and ‘to send a boat under the command of 
an officer to the suspected ship’ but the Convention stops short of providing a right of 
seizure in such case.53 Furthermore, one should not ignore the possible use of diplomatic 
protection by the national state of the individuals (unless they are themselves also stateless) 
                                                          
48 See GUILFOYLE, Douglas. Shipping Interdiction and the Law of the Sea. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009, p. 17.  
49 See UNCLOS, supra note 11, art. 105. 
50 Ibid., art. 111. 
51 See MEYERS, supra note 16, at 309-323. 
52 See further Article 110, (4) and (5). 
53 See TANAKA, Yoshifumi. The International Law of the Sea.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2015, p. 168. 
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on board a stateless ship.54 There is a jurisdiction, short of universal jurisdiction, in the case 
of unauthorised broadcasting from the high seas in terms of Article 109 of UNCLOS. There 
are further exceptional instances where a foreign ship may be intercepted on the high seas,55 
including in terms of a United Nations Security Council Resolution,56 and the right of self-
defence invoked under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter 1945.57 
 
The issue of the rights of a stateless vessel has recently resurfaced to the mv Enrica Lexie58 
case decided by the Indian Supreme Court. It has been argued that, once the St. Antony, a 
twelve-metre fishing boat,59 was not registered under the Indian Merchant Shipping Act it 
had the status of a stateless ship at the time of the incident, where two men were killed by 
Italian soldiers assigned to anti-piracy duties on the mv Enrica Lexie.60 If the St Anthony 
were indeed stateless, this argument would find comfort in the first part of the statement by 
the Privy Council in The Asya61 that: 
 
                                                          
54 See CHURCHILL, Robin R, and LOWE, Alan V. The Law of the Sea. Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1999, p. 214. 
55 See supra note 51, at 173 et seq. 
56 See, for example, S.C. Res. 1718 (Oct. 14, 2006) relating to embargo on the Democratic People’s Republic 
of Korea. 
57 U.N. Charter, art. 51 states: ‘Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security 
Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by 
Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and 
shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to 
take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and 
security.’ 
58 Supreme Court judgment. [online]. Available at: <http://www.sidi-isil.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/03/SUPREME-COURT-OF-INDIA-18.01.2013.pdf> Accessed: 3.10.2016. 
59 Supreme Court judgment, para 29. 
60 RONZITTI, Natalino. The Enrica Lexie Incident: Law of the Sea and Immunity of State Officials Issues. 
The Italian Yearbook of International Law, 2012, Vol. 22, p. 16: ‘One could argue that the St Antony, while on 
the high seas, may be equated to a stateless vessel. Stateless vessels cannot be assimilated to the territory of 
any State and it does not matter if the persons on board had Indian nationality. Stateless vessels are not 
protected under international law.’ 
61 Privy Council (1948) AC 351, at 369-370. This judgment is cited by the United States Court of Appeal (in 
United States v. Marino-Garcia and Others, 679 F. 2d 1373, 11th Circuit 1982, at paras. 13 et seq.). The US 
Court of Appeal stated that ‘vessels without nationality are international pariahs. They have no internationally 
recognised rights to move freely on the high seas…..Moreover, flagless vessels are frequently not subject to 
the laws of a flag-state. As such, they represent "floating sanctuaries from authority" and constitute a potential 
threat to the order and stability of navigation on the high seas.’ (Ibid., at para. 12). 
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Their Lordships would accept as a valid statement of the law the following 
passage from Oppenheim's International Law (6th ed.), vol. I., p. 546: "In the 
interest" of order on the open sea, a vessel not sailing under the maritime flag of 
a State enjoys no protection whatever, for the freedom "of navigation on the 
open sea is freedom for such vessels only" as sail under the flag of a State." 
Having no usual ship's papers which would serve to identify her, flying the 
Turkish flag, to which there was no evidence she had a right, hauling it down on 
the arrival of a boarding party and later hoisting a flag which was not the flag of 
any State in being, the Asya could not claim the protection of any State nor 
could any State claim that any principle of international law was broken by her 
seizure. 
However, it is not very convincing to argue that registration under the Tamil Nadu (one of 
the twenty-nine states constituting India) fishing laws as a limited registration entitling the 
register ship to navigate only in territorial waters, would render the ship stateless outside 
such waters.  The Indian Merchant Shipping Act 1958 makes provision for certain ships to 
be exempt from registration in section 22.62 Furthermore, it is undoubtedly lack of 
nationality rather than registration which renders a ship stateless. Via registration as a Tamil 
Nadu fishing vessel, and an actual and undoubtedly rigorous genuine link with India, the 
‘allocation’ and ‘immatriculation’63 of the vessel is undoubtedly Indian. It would seem to be 
very difficult, if not impossible, to argue that the St Antony was a stateless vessel, even 
though its claim to Indian nationality may arguably be lost for the purposes of domestic law 
                                                          
62 Act No 44 of 1958, § 22 reads as follows: 
‘22.Obligation to register.-  
(1) Every Indian ship, unless it is a ship which does not exceed fifteen tons net and is employed solely in 
navigation on the coast of India, shall be registered under this Act. 
(2) No ship required by sub-section (1) to be registered shall be recognised as an Indian ship unless she has 
been registered under this Act’. 
63 This is a term used by MEYERS, supra note 51, Chapter 1. 
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in terms of section 22 during navigation outside territorial waters.64 It is to be noted that on 
21 July 2015 Italy petitioned ITLOS to prescribe provisional measures under Article 290(5) 
of UNCLOS. On 24 August 2015, the Tribunal decided as a provisional measure that ‘Italy 
and India shall both suspend all court proceedings and shall refrain from initiating new ones 
which might aggravate or extend the dispute submitted to the Annex VII arbitral tribunal or 
might jeopardize or prejudice the carrying out of any decision which the arbitral tribunal 
may render.65 
 
VI. Revocation of Nationality of a Ship 
 
The Maltese Merchant Shipping Act66 provides for the revocation of nationality of ships, 
and besides making provision for such revocation via a direction by the Registrar of 
Shipping (for example, where the vessel is an actual or a constructive total loss,67 or 
consequent to the application for deletion by the owner), also grants discretion to the 
relevant minister to order cessation of registration ‘if it is in the national interest or in the 
interest of Maltese shipping’.68 A similarly wide ranging but differently worded provision is 
contained in Section 6A(b)(ii) of the Cypriot Merchant Shipping (Registration of Ships, 
Sales and Mortgages) laws of 1963 to 2005.69 In the case of British registered ships, there is 
                                                          
64 Incident occurred circa 20.5 nautical miles off the coast of India (see The ‘Enrica Lexie’ incident (Italy v. 
India) (Case No. 24), Aug. 24, 2014, ITLOS Rep., §36.   
65 See paragraph 141 of ITLOS Order dated 24 August 2015. See further The Italian Republic v. The Republic 
of India, Order 29 April 2016, by Arbitral Tribunal (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016). 
66 Chapter 234 of the Laws of Malta. 
67 Ibid., §29(2). 
68 Ibid., §29(1). However, such an administrative act by the relevant minister, which the author understands 
has been used in exceptional circumstances, would be subject to judicial review in terms of § 469A of the 
Code of Organisation and Civil Procedure (Chapter 12 of the Laws of Malta). Similarly §13 (1) of the Aircraft 
Registration Act (Chapter 503 of the Laws of Malta) provides for refusal of registration or discontinuance of 
registration inter alia when ‘in the opinion of the Minister, it would be inexpedient in the public interest for the 
aircraft to be or to continue to be registered in Malta’ (§13(1) (e)). 
69 ‘6A. Notwithstanding the provisions of this Law or of any other law for the time being in force, the Minister 
shall have additional power, whenever there are reasonable grounds which satisfy him that — ... 
 (b) the owner or the master of a Cyprus ship or any person being in charge of any Cyprus ship — ... 
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no such widely discretionary right for revocation of ship nationality by the flag state, 
although there are specific grounds for such revocation under paragraph 56 of the Merchant 
Shipping (Registration of Ships) Regulations 1993.70  
 
B. Nationality of Humans and its Commercialisation 
 
Given that the nationality of ships has been commercialised undoubtedly in part due to the 
approach of ITLOS to the meaning of the requirement of a ‘genuine link’, it comes as no 
surprise that a number of countries, including some71 in the European Union, have enacted 
legislation which some have interpreted as leading to the sale of human nationality or 
citizenship, while others treat it as a mechanism whereby talent can be attracted to the 
grantor state from foreign states. Although there are substantial similarities between 
nationalities of humans and ships, one substantial difference relates to duration. Unless 
revoked human nationality does not come to an end; on the other hand nationality of a ship 
is normally subject to a time-limit: in the case of British ship registration it is of five years.72 
Furthermore, whereas there are statutory obligations on flag states in relation to registered 
ships, when it comes to humans such controls may well be minimal once nationality is 
granted to a person who moves out of the territorial jurisdiction of the State granting 
nationality.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
(ii) uses or permits or allows the Cyprus ship to be used in operations inconsistent with the interests of the 
Republic or the public interest in general ;…’ 
See also the Maritime Act 1990 of the Republic of the Marshall Islands, §223, which inter alia, makes the 
continued validity of a vessel’s Registry Certificate subject to the ‘good standing of the owning entity’. 
70 See para. 87 of the said statutory instrument in relation to the revocation of bareboat charter registration 
under the British system.  
71 Malta and Cyprus. 
72 Merchant Shipping (Registration of Ships) Regulations 1993 (S.I. 1993/3138), para. 39. See para. 83 in 
relation to duration of British bareboat charter registration.  
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 It is a right belonging to each state to grant nationality; however there are constraints on 
this right.73 Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 enshrines at soft-
law level the principle that ‘Everyone has the right to a nationality’, and that ‘no one shall 
be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality, nor denied the right to change his nationality’. 
Statelessness seems to be a state of fact which international law tries to avoid.74 In the 
judgment in the case Perez v. Brownell75 the right to be a citizen of a state was called ‘man’s 
basic right for it is nothing less than the right to have rights’.  
 
I. Sale of Human Nationality76 and its Revocation 
 
A recent statute emanating from the parliament of the Republic of Malta77 together with the 
related Individual Investor Programme of the Republic of Malta Regulations78 has raised the 
issue inter alia in the Maltese press as to whether citizenship granted otherwise that via ius 
sanguinis, jus soli, or residence for a substantial period of time,79 can be subsequently 
                                                          
73 See PREUSS, Lawrence. International Law and Deprivation of Nationality’, Georgetown Law Journal, Vol. 
23, Issue 2, p. 250, at p. 254, where it is stated that:  ‘Every state possesses, in principle exclusive competence 
to determine the rules relative to the acquisition and loss of its nationality. This wide discretion, however, is 
not unlimited, but is restricted by duties arising from agreements with other states, and by the general 
principles of international law.’ 
74   Ibid., at 269 et seq. 
75 (1958) 356 US 44, 64, per Warren CJ. 
76 See GITTLESON, Kim. Where is the cheapest place to buy citizenship? [online]. Available at 
<http://bbc.co.uk/news/business>. Accessed 4.6.2014. 
77 The Maltese Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2013, Act No. XV of 2013.       
78 S.L. 188.03. The main general requirements are set out in para. 4(1)  of said Regulations: ‘(1) The 
qualifications and general requirements for a person to be a main applicant for citizenship under the 
programme shall be that any such person: 
(a) is at least eighteen years of age; 
(b) proposes to make a contribution as determined in the Schedule; 
(c) meets the application requirements; 
(d) commits himself to provide proof of residence in Malta, and to provide proof of title to residential property 
in Malta in accordance with these regulations; 
(e) commits himself to invest, amongst others, in stocks, bonds, debentures, special purpose vehicles or to 
make other investments as provided from time to time by Identity Malta by means of a notice in the Gazette…’ 
79 A number of countries operate a dubious ‘economic citizenship’ programme; see ANON., ‘Passports to 
Ignominy’, The Economist, Nov. 23, 2013. [online] Available at: 
<http://www.economist.com/news/americas/21590574>. Accessed 24.11.2013. 
22 
 
<revoked by the enactment of new legislation.80  In so far as international law is concerned, 
‘it is for each State to determine, through the operation of national law, who are its 
citizens’,81 but ‘this determination will be recognised at the international level so far as it 
complies with general principles of international law’.82 This view accords with Article 1 of 
the 1930 Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws83 
which provides that: 
 
It is for each State to determine under its own law who are its nationals. This 
law shall be recognised by other States in so far as it is consistent with 
international conventions, international custom, and the principles of law 
generally recognised with regard to nationality. 
 
While there is no doubt that an ordinary law can be substituted or deleted by a later act of 
Parliament, the issue posed raises human rights and international law concerns if the 
revocation, although prima facie exercised within national legal parameters, renders 
stateless the individual concerned. On this point one can refer to some notorious and 
thankfully long extinct laws depriving a citizen of nationality emanating from dictatorial 
regimes. It suffices here to mention the 1933 Nazi law providing for a process of 
denaturalisation in certain instances ‘if the naturalisation is considered undesirable.’84 
Furthermore, Preuss refers to a New Zealand law of 1917 that gave the right to the Governor 
                                                          
80 Later Regulations entitled the Individual Investors Programme of the Republic of Malta Regulations, S. L. 
188.03), provide for a rather tenuous and vaguely worded residency requirement in regulation 4 specified in 
the Guidelines ([online] Available at: <http://iip.gov.mt/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/Checklist-and 
Guidelines-4.pdf>. Accessed on 9.32016) to be a period of a minimum of 12 months preceding the date of 
issue of the certificate of naturalisation. Residency is then noticeably absent in regulation of these regulations 
in the context of the grounds for the revocation of such nationality. 
81 BATCHELOR, Carol A. Statelessness and the Problem of Resolving Nationality Status. International 
Journal of Refugee Law, Vol. 10, No. 1/2, 1998, p. 156 at p. 156. 
82 Ibid.  
83 179 L.N.T.S, 89. 
84 See supra note 73, at p. 250. 
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General, inter alia on grounds of public policy, ‘to withdraw the certificate of any British 
subject, irrespective of his nationality of origin’.85 
 
Nationality and the grant of citizenship are one of the attributes accompanying the 
sovereignty of a state. In the celebrated decision by the International Court of Justice in 
Nottenbohm,86 the Court stated that ‘according to the practice of States, to arbitral and 
judicial decisions and to the opinion of writers, nationality is a legal bond having as its basis 
a social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interest and sentiments, 
together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties’.87 The right of a state to grant 
citizenship through naturalisation was considered to be a serious and delicate matter:  
 
Naturalization is not a matter to be taken lightly. To seek and to obtain it is not 
something that happens frequently in the life of a human being. It involves his 
breaking of a bond of allegiance and his establishment of a new bond of 
allegiance. It may have far reaching consequences and involve profound 
changes in the destiny of the individual who obtains it. It concerns him 
personally, and to consider it only from the point of view of its repercussions 
with regard to his property would be to misunderstand its profound significance. 
In order to appraise its international effect, it is impossible to disregard the 
circumstances in which it was conferred, the serious character which attaches to 
it, the real and effective, and not merely the verbal preference of the individual 
seeking it for the country which grants it to him. 
                                                          
85 Ibid., at p. 260. See also reference to a similar Australian law of 1918 at pp. 260-261. 
86 Supra note 5, at p. 2. In the present case it is necessary to determine whether the naturalization conferred on 
Nottebohm can be successfully invoked against Guatemala, whether, as has already been stated, it can be 
relied upon as against that State, so that Liechtenstein is thereby entitled to exercise its protection in favour of 
Nottebohm against Guatemala (p.21). 
87 Ibid., at 23.  
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In the context of the specific details of the Nottebohm litigation, the International Court of 
Justice insisted on the requirement of a genuine link between the State and the person it was 
seeking to protect as its national: 
These facts clearly establish, on the one hand, the absence of any bond of 
attachment between Nottebohm and Liechtenstein and, on the other hand, the 
existence of a long-standing and close connection between him and Guatemala, 
a link which his naturalization in no way weakened. That naturalization was not 
based on any real prior connection with Liechtenstein, nor did it in any way alter 
the manner of life of the person upon whom it was conferred in exceptional 
circumstances of speed and accommodation. ln both respects, it was lacking in 
the genuineness requisite to an act of such importance, if it is to be entitled to be 
respected by a State in the position of Guatemala. It was granted without regard 
to the concept of nationality adopted in international relations.88 
 
At international law, naturalisation requires certain attributes for its validity. Reference is 
made in the Nottebohm judgment to  Article 5 of the 1930 of the Convention relating to the 
Conflict of Nationality Laws providing criteria of the ‘individual's genuine connections for 
the purpose of resolving questions of dual nationality which arise in third States’:89 
 
According to the practice of States, to arbitral and judicial decisions and to the 
opinions of writers, nationality is a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of 
attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments, together 
with the of reciprocal rights and duties. It may be said to constitute the juridical 
                                                          
88 Ibid., at 26. 
89 Ibid., p. 23.  
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expression of the fact that the individual upon whom it is conferred, either 
directly by the law or as the result of an act of the authorities, is in fact more 
closely connected with the population of the State conferring nationality than 
with that of any other State. Conferred by a State, it only entitles that State to 
exercise protection vis-à-vis another State, if it constitutes a translation into 
juridical terms of the individual’s connection with the State which has made him 
its national.90 
 
The European Convention on Nationality91 defines ‘nationality’ as ‘the legal bond between 
a person and a State’ and proclaims that ‘a. everyone has a right to nationality; b. 
statelessness shall be avoided; c. no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his or her 
nationality; d. neither marriage nor the dissolution of a marriage between a national of a 
State Party and an alien, nor the change of nationality by one of the spouses during 
marriage, shall automatically affect the nationality of the other spouse.’ 
 
II. Revocation of Human Nationality and the Avoidance of Statelessness 
 
The grant and possible revocation of citizenship are dealt with at both international and 
domestic law. In international law, one issue relates to revocation of citizenship in time of 
strife, civil war or war between two and more states, a matter which could have 
humanitarian implications. Undoubtedly, there is less moral objection to revocation of 
nationality where there is no genuine link between the grantor state and its naturalised 
                                                          
90 Ibid., p. 23.  
91 E.T.S. No 166. 
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citizen. Indeed the genuine link mechanism has been touted as an effective mechanism to 
the statelessness problem.92  
 
The judgment by the UK Supreme Court in Al-Jedda referred to below, considers in 
paragraph 12 the evil of statelessness and the notorious Reich Citizenship Law of 15 
September 1935 which stripped Jewish individuals of their German citizenship. Such 
arbitrary revocation, normally associated with fascist or other dictatorial regimes, 
particularly if based on racial or similar attributes, would undoubtedly constitute an abus de 
droit93 and should be struck down accordingly. 
 
In this Supreme Court judgment, reference is also made to the soft law provision contained 
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 which provides in Article 14 that 
‘everyone has the right to a nationality, and that ‘no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his 
nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality’. Furthermore reference is made in 
the judgment to the statement of Warren CJ in Perez v. Brownell94 that the right to a 
nationality is a ‘man’s basic right, for it is nothing than the right to have rights’, and also95 
to the European Convention on Nationality 1997 which, whilst providing for seven 
instances of revocation of citizenship, disallows such revocation in six of such instances 
where this would cause statelessness, except where nationality had been obtained by 
misrepresentation or fraud.96 The Supreme Court made reference to the judgment of the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Karassev v Finland,97 where the court had 
stated that: ‘Although right to a citizenship is not as such guaranteed by the Convention or 
                                                          
92 See WEISSBRODT, David and COLLINS, Clay. The Human Rights of Stateless Persons. Human Rights 
Quarterly, Vol. 28, 2006, p. 245, at p. 276.  
93 PREUSS, supra note 73, at pp. 250-276. 
94 (1958) 356 US 44, 64. 
95 Al-Jedda, UK Supreme Court 2013 at para. 21.  
96 Ibid., §7. 
97 (1999) 28 E.H.R.R. C.D. 312. 
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its Protocols (cf. No. 11278/84, Dec. 1 July 1985, D.R. 43, pp. 216 at 220), the Court does 
not exclude that an arbitrary denial of a citizenship might in certain circumstances raise an 
issue under Article 8 of the Convention because of the impact of such a denial on the private 
life of the individual.’ In that case the ECtHR dealt with a claim by an individual that the 
Finnish authorities had refused to recognise as a Finnish citizen. However, the application 
was rejected as the evidence pointed to the fact that when the applicant was born, he did 
have a right to Finnish citizenship. The court did not find that there was a breach of Article 
8 of the European Convention. Furthermore the applicant and his family had not been 
refused an alien passport or other social benefits. Furthermore the Court found that there had 
not been a breach of Article 14 of the Convention. On the basis of this case, it would appear 
that if a state does not recognise or withdraws citizenship to a person with access to another 
citizenship, without infringing their private or family life, there would not be a breach of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Despite its limitations, and despite not 
accepting that the right to nationality is an inherent human right, the Strasbourg Court 
recognises the human rights implications of withdrawal of citizenship, thereby 
acknowledging that the powers of a state in relation to nationality and citizenship are not 
unlimited. This judgment can be compared to the more outright statement contained in an 
advisory opinion of the American Court of Human Rights in Re Amendments to the 
Naturalization Provisions of the Constitution of Costa Rica,98 which goes as far as 
proclaiming the general acceptance of nationality as ‘an inherent right of all human 
beings.’99    
                                                          
98 Advisory opinion dated 19 January 1984, OC-4/84, as cited in CHAN, Johannes M.M. The Right to 
Nationality as a Human Right – The Current Trend Towards Recognition. Human Rights Law Journal, Vol. 
12, No. 1-2, 1991, p. 1 at pp. 5-6. 
99 ‘It is generally accepted today that nationality is an inherent right of all human beings. Not only is 
nationality the basic requirement for the exercise of political rights. It also has an important bearing on the 
individual’s legal capacity. Thus, despite the fact that it is traditionally accepted that the conferral and 
regulation of nationality are matters for each State to decide, contemporary developments indicate that 
international law does impose certain limits on the broad powers enjoyed by the States in that area, and that the 
manner in which States regulate matters bearing on nationality cannot today be deemed within their sole 
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Minimum standards of treatment of stateless persons are addressed in the 1954 Convention 
relating to the Status of Stateless Persons.100 The UN Convention on the Reduction of 
Statelessness 1961,101 Article 8(1), provides the general principle that ‘a Contracting State 
shall not deprive a person of its nationality if such deprivation would render him stateless’; 
this general principle is subject to exceptions, specified in Articles 7 and 8(2) thereof. 
 
Revocation of citizenship obtained by naturalisation has been an issue addressed recently by 
the UK Supreme Court in Al-Jedda v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Open 
Society Justice Initiative intervening)102 where the Supreme Court overruled a decision by 
the Secretary of State to withdraw citizenship. The issue dealt with by the Supreme Court 
related specifically to section 40 of the amended British Nationality Act 1981103 which in 
sub-section (4) provides that ‘the Secretary of State may not make an order under subsection 
(2) [depriving a person of citizenship status on the grounds that this is conducive to the 
public good] if he is satisfied that the order would make a person stateless’. The Supreme 
Court refuted the assertion by the Secretary of State that a purposive interpretation should be 
applied to the effect that, where there were grounds for an order for revocation of 
citizenship, she should not be disabled from revoking it ’in circumstances in which it 
remains open to the person so easily and so immediately to avoid becoming stateless’.104 
The UK Supreme Court reached this view despite the fact that counsel for the Secretary of 
State restricted this argument ‘to the re-acquisition of a former nationality as opposed to the 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
jurisdiction; those powers of the State are also circumscribed by their obligations to ensure the full protection 
of human rights. 
The classical doctrinal position, which viewed nationality as an attribute granted by the State to its subjects, 
has gradually evolved to the point that nationality is today perceived as involving the jurisdiction of the State 
as well as human rights issues.’ 
100 360 U.N.T.S. 117. 
101 989 U.N.T.S. 175. 
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acquisition of a fresh nationality’.105 The response of the Home Secretary has been to 
propose an amendment to the legislation whereby in the case of persons whose conduct 
seriously prejudices UK interests they could be ‘stripped of their passports’, presumably 
thus referring to denaturalisation, even if this has the effect of rendering them stateless,106 
although it is possible to envisage a situation where a passport is withdrawn via the use of 
the Royal Prerogative without revocation of nationality, an idea recently floated by the UK 
Government as a mechanism of dealing with British nationals returning to the UK after 
fighting for ISIL in Iraq and Syria.107 The Al-Jedda case resurfaced before the Special 
Immigration Appeals Commission in Al-Jedda v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department which on 18 July 2014 accepted that Al-Jedda had not been rendered stateless 
by a deprivation order, and determined that a deprivation order made under the British 
Nationality Act 1981 was not preceded by a duty to consult.108 
 
Furthermore, there is the issue as to whether the revocation of the citizenship (by 
naturalisation) of a member state of the European Union,109 has the effect of revoking 
European citizenship. In this respect, one can refer to Article 8 inserted by the Treaty on 
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European Union110 into the EC Treaty. This provides that: ‘1. Every person holding the 
nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. 2. Citizens of the Union shall 
enjoy the rights conferred by this Treaty and shall be subject to the duties imposed thereby.” 
This has led to the view that ‘a denationalised person would be a Union citizen in a member 
State of which he was not a national.’111  
 
III. Conclusion   
 
Nationality of ships and of humans has in some legal systems moved away from the 
requirement of a pre-existing genuine link to one where nationality is a commodity which is 
available for a consideration. Whereas it may be understandable that, on the basis of ethical 
considerations, a pre-existing genuine link could be treated as less contentious consideration 
in the case of a ship than in the case of a human, there is no doubt that effective control (the 
basis of the genuine link notion as interpreted in The Saiga No. 2 and post-Saiga), is 
undoubtedly more necessary in the case of a ship which may be outside the jurisdiction of 
any State than in the case of a human. The success of port state control112 as distinct from 
the patchy implementation of flag-state control113 coupled with the Saiga No 2 approach is 
consistent with the view that nationality of ships is not necessarily based on a genuine link 
but can be a mere administrative exercise where nationality may be bought and sold. As 
indicated above, there is at least some patchy state practice that nationality of humans is 
                                                          
110 OJ C 326, 26.10.2012, pp. 13–390. 
111 HALL, Stephen. Loss of Union citizenship in breach of human rights. European Law Review, 1996, p. 129 
at p. 143. 
112 See, for instance: Paris MOU, Port State Control, Annual report 2014. [online] Available at: 
<https://www.parismou.org>. Accessed: 3.10.2016;  Directive 2009/16/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 23 April 2009 on Port State Control [2009] OJ L131/57; Directive 2013/38 (EU); Commission 
Regulation (ERU) 428/2010; Commission Regulation (EU) No. 801/2010; Commission Regulation (EU) 
1205/2012. 
113 See, in particular, HAYASHI, Moritaka. Toward the Elimination of Substandard Shipping: The Report of 
the International Commission on Shipping. The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, Vol. 16, 
No. 3, p. 501, at pp. 506-507. 
31 
 
moving towards a similar administrative scenario. Revocation of nationality of ships is very 
unlikely to raise human rights considerations other than those based on Article 1 of Protocol 
No. 1 of the European Convention or a similar norm in a legal system in a State which is not 
a party to that Convention.   
If a state revokes nationality which had been acquired on a cash for passport basis without 
the requisites provided for in international law, it would appear that that state has substantial 
leeway at international law, provided that that person has a right to revert to another 
nationality, and provided that at the time of revocation that person has not sanitised his 
acquired nationality by the creation of a Nottebohm genuine link. In the case of a passport 
for cash the transaction may arguably be treated as having ‘essentially the nature of 
contract’114 and should be treated as such rather than as one of revocation of nationality. In 
line with Article 7 (1) of the European Convention on Nationality 1997, a State party to that 
Convention may well provide for the loss of nationality in the case of a ‘lack of a genuine 
link between the State Party and a national habitually residing abroad’; this power however 
is not available where ‘the person concerned would thereby become stateless’115 or where 
the Convention is not part of municipal law. The convention however does not address the 
issue raised in the Al-Jedda case in the UK as to the legal position where statelessness 
follows revocation of nationality but another nationality, possibly based on jus sanguinis or 
jus soli, is available to the person in question. Furthermore, if a state grants nationality of 
convenience but then changes heart and revokes it, the expulsion of such an individual if 
rendered stateless, may involve the infringement of the rights of the state to which the 
person is expelled.116 
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Furthermore the right to a private and family life under Article 8 of the ECHR may give rise 
to a right of action by the aggrieved person, but this may well be avoided by the sort of 
precautions taken by Finland in the Karassev case. Obviously a revocation of a right of a 
cash for passport type citizenship may well give a right to the aggrieved party to invoke the 
provisions of Article 1 Protocol 1 of the ECHR if he/she is not adequately compensated for 
the revocation.  
